КОРПОРАТИВНОЕ ЛИДЕРСТВО (CO.1)

**Производственная задача**

Корпоративная организация осуществляет стратегическое руководство и выполняет лидерскую функцию в управлении деятельностью атомных станций с целью непрерывного совершенствования и поддержания высокого уровня безопасной и надежной эксплуатации и реагирования на чрезвычайные ситуации.

The corporate organization provides strategic leadership and leadership in the management of nuclear power plants to continuously improve and maintain a high level of safe and reliable operation and emergency response.

**Область для улучшения CO.1-1**

**…проблема….** …описание проблемы….

**The ATE Strategy and Safety Culture Policy are not focusing enough on Nuclear Safety improvement (NS);** The goals and objectives of the company are primarily focused on entering in international markets, but has not formulated specific goals and actions to develop a Nuclear Safety culture. In the Safety Policy, Nuclear Safety Culture aspects are considered in parallel with industrial and fire safety. As consequence the message on Nuclear Safety is diluted and is not highlighting sufficiently **the specificity of nuclear industry** **which is unique.** This could led to confusion of some leaders and staff inot understanding enough the importance of Nuclear Safety Culture.

**Despite the ATE Safety policy** has been written and action plan has been defined beginning of 2021 there are **some confusions** for some leaders and staff in branches on understanding the specificity of Nuclear Safety culture. The **message on Nuclear Safety culture is diluted** and understood more like Industrial safety than something unique and specific. As consequence some Nuclear Safety Culture traits are note fully implemented on the field and improvement can be realized.

* No specific nuclear safety indicators
* Some traits related to nuclear safety culture are Missing in self-assessment report
* Gaps are generally related to industrial safety
* Risks related to nuclear safety are not fully considered and managed

**Причины и способствующие факторы (Causes and contributing factors)**

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**Подтверждающие факты (Supporting facts)**

1. The current Safety policy as it is written could be used in all kind of industries (automobile, chemical, oil....). The nuclear is very specific with potential consequence which could happen in case of bad behaviour of workers. The Safety policy highlighting more **Nuclear** Safety policy will give opportunity for leaders to reinforce the attention of the workers the risks in Nuclear environnement.
2. It was noted that despite the policy and the real atmosphere, (with small mistakes) there are cases of non-declaration of their own mistake by the staff. This means that such principles, like personal responsibility, environment for the statement of problems, communication about safety should still be developed during actual performance of work. At the same time, each employee can freely come to the Director of the branch, tell him about the problems, about mistakes without any consequences.
3. When asked about the details of the plan for the development of a nuclear safety culture (NSC), there was highlighted careful selection to recruit young specialists with good results in universities to work in the branch. Their familiarization and development in the NSС theoretical training, mentoring with the help of line managers and refresher courses were noted. Such a programme does not contain a systematic NSC development plan for all branch staff, and will focus just mainly on professional knowledge.
4. The Branch IMS expert said that the safety culture policy of the company is implemented and that the level of safety culture in the branch is high enough. He also stated that no NSC evaluation had been conducted.
5. The interviewee Branch deputy chief Engineer in charge of training was unfamiliar with the error prevention principles published in the REA brochure. He has not seen the Nuclear Safety Culture Improvement (NSC) plan. He said at this stage at the branch, it is important to select personnel based on professional knowledge, motivation focuses on material.
6. One of the main functions of the ETSS (Engineering technical support shop) is to support the current operation of the NPP. Some of the activities performed have an impact on nuclear safety and for which an assessment and risk management measures are required. Risk management measures are not included in the programs / conclusions on the possibility to extend the equipment lifetime.
7. To the question "How does affect your activity during commissioning and maintenance of NPP operation the nuclear safety," he replied that the Customer has the License and we take only part in the work and only perform the works according the work permits / Programs. This opinion contradicts one of the principles of the nuclear safety culture "personal and collective responsibility".
8. According to DCE, based on the technology, each branch manager performs walkrounds of workplaces and monitors the work of personnel. During the walkrounds, the safety matters and SC are discussed. There is no formalized procedure for observing the work, and the results of the walkrounds are not recorded.
9. DCE for APCS was appointed to the job position according to the succession plan, he was trained according to the IPP for the job position, during the training on labor protection, fire safety regulation, civil defense and emergency situations he used the "Standard" DLS (distance learning system), after which he passed the examinations. PNAE and nuclear safety standards are not included in the scope of his knowledge.
10. There is no procedure for not feeding foreign objects on opened equipment, which can lead to an event with a foreign object hit during work. During the training of personnel on the PPI, the topic for avoiding foreign objects on the opened equipment is not included. What can lead to an event during the work performance. RATE has no procedure for working on opened (unsealed) equipment. The briefings on such work are not carried out, although the possibility of such work at the commissioning organization is available. In the ATE attention is paid to the problem of preventing the ingress of foreign objects (PIFO) into the equipment and systems of the NPP: the personnel are informed if such an event has occurred and measures are being prepared. There are restrictions in the SAW programs for PIFO, at some operating Nuclear Power Plants such as Balakov NPP and Kalinin NPP, the PIFO requirements are included in contracts. In ATE there is no systematic training on PIFO. There is no procedure for PIFO in SMATE.
11. Questions on the problem of preventing the ingress of foreign objects (PIFO) are not included in the program of personnel individual training program.
12. There is no methodical work to develop the leadership qualities among Managers and there is no plan for the development of leaders in ATE. The Manager of CATE and MB do not always receive training in external organizations, including in terms of leadership and safety culture.
13. The results of the questionnaire survey of ATE personnel to assess the state of the Design Bureau (460 people): Both ATE Managers and specialists do not rate the strategic commitment to safety in the company highly (on the 5-point scale - 3.4 and 3.3, respectively). The Managers and employees believe that ATE often violates the requirements of industry and company standards and procedures. Below the average for ATE, the state of indicators characterizing the development of the safety management system is assessed. ("Report on the results of self-assessment of the state of Design Bureaus in 2020", pp. 12, 14)
14. Safety Assessment: During inspections, inconsistencies / violations are revealed mainly in the field of labor protection. This is due to the insufficient competence of the inspection personnel to perform the functions of internal safety control. (Report "Analysis of the state and trends of safety and labor protection in ATE for 2020", p. 13).
15. Independent nuclear supervision by the MB focuses mainly on labor protection and compliance with the rules for working with personnel (knowledge testing, briefings, etc.). In response to the question "How are risks taken into account when you perform the activities for nuclear safety," the answer was "... focused only on the actions of personnel in cases of equipment malfunction ..."
16. The presentations on ATE and CATE work contained the results that "no violations were made due to the fault of the personnel." For a company that prides itself on its personnel innocence policy, such a phrase indicates an unattainable level of non-penalty policy.
17. Self-assessment of the state of safety culture in 2020, carried out according to the "Methodological guidelines for organizing and conducting a self-assessment of the state of safety culture in the Electric Power Division of the Concern Rosenergoatom. The self-assessment program of the state of safety culture does not cover all the criteria for a healthy nuclear culture in accordance with WANO document "Principles. 2013-1". For example: there are no criteria QA.1" Nuclear activity is perceived as something specific and unique", QA.4" Lack of complacency ", CO.3" Free passage of information ", CO.4" Management expectations "
18. **Development of the principles of Safety Culture.** ATE actively works with personnel, including with the involvement of third-party organizations to explain and develop the principles of design bureau. However, according to some managers, the level of design bureaus of ATE personnel is still lagging behind the level of nuclear power plants. Some managers believe that their personnel can influence nuclear safety only when performing nuclear hazardous work. Leaders are not sufficiently aware of the “weak” characteristics of CB identified in past surveys / self-assessments. Some managers did not receive training in nuclear safety and RP when they were appointed to the position. The relevance of error prevention among "pioneer adjusters" who are the first to start working with existing equipment.
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**Текущее состояние и перспективы**

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